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 This chapter traces the origins, meanings and characteristics of “the human” 
in recent time – its  forms . The chapter contends that, instead of being immu-
table, “the human” has taken different forms, been ascribed different mean-
ings, and exhibited different characteristics over time. Our approach to “the 
human” contributes to this volume on digital existence, which confronts 
existential questions centered on being and technology, with historical and 
anthropological awareness. We aim to show, through  Foucault’s (1971 ) 
insistence upon the  forms of subjectivity as opposed to its substance, how 
understandings of “the human” are subject to change and transformation. 
Exploring these diverse understandings helps us to capture how human 
beings have related to each other and the world, and understood themselves 
at different points in time. This exploration also shows how human beings’ 
relationships have developed in conjunction with new configurations of 
politics and technology. 
 To achieve our goal, this theoretical essay aims to carefully distinguish 
the concept of “human-as-is,” the being, concrete, existing, mortal instance 
of a human being, from the concept of “human-as-category,” the enfram-
ing, abstract, general, human being in discourse as an object. In embark-
ing upon an exploratory project to map “the human,” we hence define 
the “human-as-is” as referring to the real, living, thinking, walking crea-
tures we are, whereas the “human-as-category” refers to conceptualizations 
of human beings (e.g., by anthropologists, politicians and philosophers). 
Thus, “human-as-is” persists despite the worlds of discourse and language 
that “human-as-category” depends on. “Human-as-is” is what “human-
as-category” refers to and claims to know and thus our project here is 
to explore the exact relational nature of this reference and precisely how 
“human-as-category” describes and corresponds to “human-as-is.” We wish 
to show, more generally, how the existential questions confronted in this 
volume are embedded in the worlds in which they are asked (and indeed 
enframed). We argue these worlds both assume and produce particular ver-
sions of “human-as-category” that exhibit family resemblance and have 
particular relations to “human-as-is.” 
 Death in life and life in death 
 Forms and fates of the human 
 Connor Graham and Alfred Montoya 
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 Through this exploration we will ultimately confront the question of 
the possible fates of “the human,” its forms and the reality in which it is 
embedded, with regard to life and death, in a technology-shaped future. 
For example, Denisa Kera explores how new scientific understandings and 
technologies have exposed the human being as a “configurations of the ‘net-
work’,” a barely-contained riot of diverse organic and inorganic elements 
seeking “to return to their inorganic past and future” ( 2014 , pp. 185, 191). 
Under these conditions, death is simply the body losing control over its 
various components, a natural tendency toward entropy disintegrating the 
human being, understood as a temporary entanglement of elements. How 
might an examination of such a posthuman “human-as-category” inform 
and relate to the generalization of existential questions centered on “human-
as-is”? More boldly, what might the limits of our existential preoccupations 
be in light of recent technological and scientific developments, and how 
might they be acknowledged and compensated for? 
 We argue, drawing on  Foucault (1971 ), that a consideration of the 
“human-as-category” enlarges the scope of contextual elements enabling 
assertions about what the human being is or might become, placing these 
forms squarely within certain historical moments, and certain configura-
tions of politics, economics and technology. Many reflections on individual 
existence, or propositions concerning the “human-as-is,” such a “Man” and 
the “Human,” are the products of particular times and places, providing 
windows through which to frame and view “human-as-is” in discourse. 
Some of these reflections and propositions concerning the “human-as-is,” 
what we call its forms or the “human-as-category,” appeared quite recently, 
the products of elite or expert discourses. And such  forms will continue to 
appear for as long as we human beings exist and have the desire and power 
to reflexively consider ourselves, other human beings and the world in which 
we live. Though “the human” is colloquially deployed interchangeably with 
“people” and “persons,” and typically conceptualized as a timeless given, 
often by elites, scholars have recently been pointing out the historical and 
contingent nature of this object. “The human” in human rights, for example, 
is of quite recent invention ( Moyn 2010 ). 
 How then is “the human” enframed, defined, understood and given mean-
ing in relation to digital technologies of the modern era and in the new debate 
about existential media? And exactly which human beings are involved in 
this enframing, understanding and meaning making? How effectively can 
they speak for all human beings? As John Durham Peters has argued, “The 
world and the human condition are pervaded recursively by human hand 
and crafting” (in  Lagerkvist 2017 , p. 100). That is, human beings fashion the 
world they inhabit, both conceptually and practically, generating the tools 
for, and ways of knowing about, that world and themselves. This may have 
happened in an everyday sense through history as human beings have lived 
their lives. But is the relationship between all human beings and technologies 
throughout time the same? How does the human-technology relationship 
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in-the-world correspond to different worlds of discourse and who has had 
a voice in these worlds? 
 In this chapter we use a broad definition of (digital) media as “vehicles 
that carry and communicate meaning” ( Peters 2016 , p. 2). We also con-
ceive contemporary technology as “an existential and ambivalent terrain” 
(Lagerkvist 2017, p. 103). By drawing on prior work from outside existence 
philosophy, we aim to contribute further to the mapping of that “terrain,” 
primarily by understanding the relationship between “human-as-category” 
and “human-as-is” in recent time. This mapping concentrates on how worlds 
of discourse account for  and , more provocatively, in this act of ‘accounting 
for,’ might shape the very existence of human beings. This is a “terrain” and 
a moment that has been called the “epoch of equipment” ( Dreyfus 1992 , 
p. 175) because of the ubiquity of technologies of different kinds that frame 
human perception, action and existence. We believe it is important for the 
analysis of existential media to reflect upon how its discourse centered on 
digital media (re)conceives of “the human.” In other words, inspired by 
the approach of Foucault, we interrogate the relationship and correspon-
dence between the forms and reality of “the human,” clarifying the grounds 
from which new forms of “the human” are emerging, and what these forms 
emphasize. We consider that these are necessary steps toward imagining new 
futures, relations and vulnerabilities for human beings, including consider-
ations related to mortality. This approach carefully recognizes the distinc-
tion between the very real existence of “the human” and the different worlds 
of discourse, worlds that neither fully construct human beings nor are inde-
pendent of them. 
 Our starting point for discussion is Amanda Lagerkvist’s recently posited 
figure of the “exister” ( Lagerkvist 2017 , p. 101). This “exister” is grounded 
in and enframed by technology, insofar as humans and technology have 
always co-produced one another. 
 The exister is mortal. She is a struggling, suffering and relational human 
being. Her intermediary position as a conscious (yet often clueless) 
embodied being provides for her the only known ‘entry point’ to navi-
gate and craft the world into which she is thrown.  
 (p. 101) 
 The exister moves through the world relying on her “tools of everyday exis-
tence”, including digital media, to make sense of her “digital throwness,” 
taking up the necessary task of making meaning under these new techno-
logical conditions ( Lagerkvist 2017 , pp. 99, 97). This provocative new !gure 
is, in our terms, a conceptualization of a speci!c form of human being that is 
conceived from a particular historical moment and a speci!c con!guration 
of technology, politics and ethics. It is a !gure that has been elided in many 
studies of digital media due to a focus on a particular, modern imagina-
tion of progress. The “exister” is derived from concepts that emerged from 
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a particularly productive and powerful mid and late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century thinking centred on human mortality, alienation, meaning 
and freedom. These concepts and concerns were impelled and nourished by 
widespread social and economic reorganizations in the wake of rapid Euro-
pean industrialization and urbanization, the imperial expansion that drove 
both, and the dislocations generated by the World War I and World War II. 
 The “exister” is also a particular, if expansive, proposal for “human-as-is,” 
a figure rooted in earlier conceptions of human beings in existence philoso-
phy such as  Dasein (p. 100) that precede the digital. It is pre-cultural, and 
beyond race, class or gender specificity, “stressing the hardship and struggle 
of any human life whether in scarcity or post-scarcity cultures” (p. 100). 
The “exister” designates the experiential or existential infrastructure shared 
by all human beings. Like its contemporary and cousin, the “Human” in 
“human rights,” it emphasizes precarity, vulnerability and suffering, and 
claims for itself all human beings across time and space, and difference. The 
concept of the “exister” is a critical intervention that draws much-needed 
attention to embodied vulnerabilities. It is particularly useful for taking up 
all media as “existential media,” producing new existential problems and 
offering new spaces for the consideration of old concerns ( Lagerkvist and 
Anderson 2017 , p. 2). It supports a diagnosis of the possibilities and chal-
lenges faced by those human groups for whom the ubiquity and penetration 
of digital media and ways of being have blurred the old categories of on- and 
off-line. Our analysis takes this figure, the “exister,” up as addressing both 
“human-as-is” and “human-as-category.” 
 This chapter presents its exploratory argument first by identifying and 
briefly contextualizing two treatments of “the human,” those of Foucault 
and Virilio, identifying key transitions and examining the characteristics 
of each of these proposed forms. Both theorists reference human beings’ 
vulnerabilities, including mortality. We draw on Foucault’s observations on 
the origins of Enlightenment-era “Man,” the living, laboring and speaking 
subject and object of knowledge, the more recent “Human” of human rights 
discourse, and Virilio’s “terminal citizen,” the connected, extended and dis-
embodied victim of mediated urban life. 
 We then analyze more recent scholarship on human mortality and tech-
nology. We have selected works which seem to make a proposal for a 
“human-as-is,” attempting to identify in these proposals the specific charac-
teristics ascribed to the posited figures of “the human,” or those characteris-
tics assumed by their authors, with particular reference to “Man,” “Human,” 
and “terminal citizen.” We have attempted to consider the relations with 
and correspondence to these three figures in these contemporary writings 
through particular attention to “classical existential themes”: “Death: our 
finitude and the digital afterlife” and “Being there: presence and absence” 
(Lagerkvist 2016, pp. 103, 105). In this analysis, we identify the extent to 
which “Man,” “Human,” and “terminal citizen” retain coherence as fig-
ures with fixed sets of attributes. We also wish to consider the extent to 
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which they exert influence into the present and even potentially might shape 
our near future understandings of what it means to be “human.” Through 
returning to the “exister,” we end by considering how “human-as-category” 
might infect and inflect “human-as-is,” the existence and living reality of 
human beings, both today and in time to come. 
 We take seriously Lagerkvist’s assertion that “Questions concerning digi-
tal technologies are questions concerning human existence,” and her analysis 
of the sets of new (digital) conditions not all of our own making, but not 
entirely deterministic either, into which we are “thrown” ( 2017 , pp. 96, 97). 
Our machines, she writes, “have evolved into environmental and wearable 
tools of existence” as we have become “Reliant on devices that enable our 
lives” ( 2017 , pp. 97, 98). We may agree with Peters who argues that “it is in 
the elusive and recalcitrant that we find the homeland of media, and thus the 
heart of what humans have wrought” and that “media, like human beings, 
are always in the middle between sea, earth and sky” (2015, p. 12). However, 
the recent reach, extent, agency and even intelligence of digital media and 
machines raise the possibilities of not only a reciprocal relationship between 
‘fleshy’ and ‘digital’ existence, but of new forms of life (and death) that reach 
beyond a new instance of “human-as-category.” As we hope to illustrate, in 
these prospective forms and fates of “the human,” digital media is not only 
‘in between’ or “a terrain” but integral to “human-as-is.” 
 “Man” and “the Human” 
 We human beings are self-aware. We human beings have generated system-
atic religions and secular thought throughout the ages, seeking to make sense 
of ourselves, our condition and our vulnerabilities, driven by a profound 
knowledge of our own finitude. Existentialist thought, with its emphasis on 
being and its relationship to the world, is a modern attempt to grapple with 
such enduring sense-making. But can this discourse make general proposi-
tions about all of humankind? How do the largely privileged writings of 
European elites from the mid-nineteenth to the mid twentieth century con-
nect with the experience and futures of the full range of urban human beings 
alive today? How might we theorize a global “human,” past or future, and 
should such a figure exist? 
 The regimes of digitalization that permeate our contemporary world 
may seem to generate similar, if not identical dilemmas, for peoples across 
cultures and socioeconomic situations. Certainly, the concept of the “exis-
ter,” and other propositions for “humans-as-is” aim to provide a lens or a 
framework for an exploration of these commonalities. However, internet 
penetration, for instance, is profoundly uneven across the planet. In 2017, 
the International Telecommunications Union, a UN body, estimated that 
while 84.4 percent of households in developed countries had internet access 
in some form, only 42.9 percent of households in developing countries, and 
only 14.7 percent of households in least developed countries did so ( ITU 
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2017 ). The report also indicates a gender gap of about 12 percent world-
wide in terms of relative access to the internet between males and females 
( ITU 2017 ). Apart from these empirical issues, there are also problems of 
language: how does any concept speak for both the general human being 
and the subaltern? 
 In order to begin to take these questions seriously we draw a distinction 
between the “human-as-is” and “human-as-category.” “Human-as-is,” in 
line with existential writings, describes the being, concrete, existing, mortal 
instance of a human being in reality, the primal creature that lives, breathes 
and walks outside any conceptualization if itself in discourse. “Human-
as-category,” on the other hand, captures the enframing, abstract, general 
human that has been proposed in discourses of different kinds for different 
purposes (e.g., “Man,” the “Human,” etc). It draws our attention to the total-
izing or globalizing “humanity projects” ( Rees 2014 ) of various academic 
and political actors who have made proposals concerning the “human-as-is” 
over time and generalized it. Its aim is to provide a second order observation 
( Luhmann 1998 ) or analysis concerning human beings. Each of these human 
versions have different instances, and they can inform each other. So, for 
example, the existential acuteness of certain kinds of human beings’ experi-
ence, such as suffering, illuminated through the “human-as-is” term, can be 
understood and responded to through a “human-as-category” instantiation, 
that of the “Human” in human rights. 
 In the  Order of Things , Michel Foucault traced the emergence of the 
Enlightenment figure of “Man,” in our terms, a novel eighteenth-century 
proposition concerning the “human-as-is.” In the Classical Age, according 
to Foucault, human beings did not consider themselves makers or artificers, 
but were simply agents of clarification and classification, through clear and 
certain ideas, of the world created by God. This relied on the assumption 
that the medium of representation, language, was reliable and transparent. 
The human being merely gave artificial description to an order that already 
existed through language and a conventional ordering of categories and 
resemblances ( Foucault 1971 ; see also  Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983 ). Human 
beings could not enter the Classical scheme as both ordering subject and 
posited object ( Foucault 1971 ). “Man as that being who gets the whole pic-
ture as well as gets into the picture is unthinkable in the Classical episteme” 
( Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983 , p. 27). For Foucault, it was not possible for 
human beings’ existence to be called into question on its own account at this 
point in history, “since it contained the nexus of representation and being” 
( Foucault 1971 , p. 311). 
 A new figure leaps into being at the end of the eighteenth century, a time 
of transition between craftsmanship and industrialization ( Dreyfus 1992 , 
p. 174). This figure, “Man,” once merely one more creature amongst the 
others, albeit with a special role of clarifying God’s creation, now finds itself 
a subject among objects, albeit one with a peculiar problem. Not content to 
understand only the objects of the world, “Man” turns the powers of reason 
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onto itself. “Man” becomes both subject and object of its understanding, 
an understanding now limited by a new conceptualization of language not 
as a timeless, transparent, God-given system, but as a web of meaning with 
its own history and mechanisms ( Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983 , p. 28). “Man 
appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a sub-
ject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator, he appears in the 
place belonging to the king” ( Foucault 1971 , p. 312). “Man,” following Fou-
cault’s analysis, is in our terms, a “human-as-category,” situated in discourse 
at a particular historical juncture. The “human-as-is” here is understood as 
corresponding to “human-as-category” which, in turn, brings “human-as-is” 
into being: relations are collapsed and the thinking, reasoning human being 
is celebrated. “Man,” after all, is both subject and object, capable of reason 
and therefore responsible for conjuring up a representation of itself through 
specific ways of knowing and speaking about that self. “Man” is also an 
instance of “human-as-category,” a set of relations and ways of knowing 
that are taken up by human beings and which shape the experiences and 
expectations of those human beings. 
 Having lost the ability to rely on a transcendental subject to guarantee 
the order of the cosmos and the transparency of the mode of representation 
of that order, “Man” is thrust back on its own limitations. “Man’s finitude 
is heralded – and imperiously so – in the positivity of knowledge,” writes 
 Foucault (1971 , p. 313). Human limitations are transformed by Enlight-
enment thinkers and scientists into the very basis of all positive empirical 
knowledge within what Foucault calls an analytic of finitude. Foucault 
famously predicted the end of “Man,” as the fragmentation of language 
and the sudden opacity of representation that gave birth to “Man” at the 
end of the Classical Age was likewise losing out in a contemporary world. 
In this world “language is now emerging with greater and greater insistence 
in a unity that we ought to think but cannot as yet do so” ( Foucault 1971 , 
p. 386). “Man” was, he suspected, nearing its end. For our purposes, the 
“human-as-category” instance “Man” begins to seriously consider the very 
subjectivity and mortality, vulnerability and limitations of “human-as-is” as 
the means by which it produces knowledge about itself and the world. This 
gives rise to the empirical sciences and technological progress. Human vul-
nerability and limitations are no longer simply burdens, but are taken up as 
the very means of understanding and overcoming the vagaries of the world 
and human beings through specific linear, modern notions of progress. Such 
a system no longer needs be guaranteed by God. 
 However, the twentieth century, driven by tumultuous violence and scien-
tific and technological developments, also proposed its own responses to the 
question of what human beings are today. In  The Origins of Totalitarianism , 
Hannah Arendt identified a paradox concerning the figure of “Man” and its 
heir, the “human-as-category” instance we call the “Human.” This “Human” 
is the object at the center of a global discourse and apparatus referred to as 
“humanitarian,” or the figure we talk about when we talk about “human 
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rights.” “From the beginning,” Arendt writes, “the paradox involved in 
the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an 
‘abstract’ human being  who seemed to exist nowhere ” ( 1962 , p. 291, italics 
added). This was an especially serious issue in the context of the refugee cri-
sis driven by the rise of European fascism and the violence of World War II. 
For Arendt, the stateless refugee provoked an immediate and serious crisis 
for the domain of knowledge, discourse and practice then attempting to con-
solidate itself around this abstract “Human.” This “human-as-category” had 
little practical correspondence to certain real human beings and their vulner-
abilities. For instance, refugees, no longer part of a nation-state and who had 
recourse suddenly only to their status as human beings, found quickly that 
these lofty ideals provided little benefit or security: 
 The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being 
human. And in view of objective political conditions, it is hard to say 
how the concepts of man upon which human rights are based . . . could 
have helped to find a solution to the problem. 
 ( Arendt 1962 , p. 299) 
 The “Human,” through the latter half of the twentieth century, provided 
part of this solution. It emerged as a site of contestation, giving weight to 
itself primarily through elaboration of the rights said to be proper to it, 
and consequently, of the risks it acquired because of these rights. Thus this 
instance of “human-as-category” became populated and de!ned through 
an understanding of “human-as-is” as encompassing particular experiences 
and vulnerabilities and engagement with the world and other humans 
beyond self-knowledge. During the Cold War, the competing interests and 
ideological positions of the United States and the USSR, from the time 
of the UN commission that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), contributed to shaping this !gure. These interests pro-
vided it with rights emphasized by the Soviets (social and economic rights, 
concerned with access to economic resources and communal obligations/
protections) and those stressed by the United States (civil and political 
rights, concerned with individual freedoms, free speech, etc.) ( Johnson and 
Symonides 1998 , p. 43). The new !gure’s ill-de!ned “abstraction,” its sta-
tus as a pure instance of “human-as-category,” perfectly positioned it to 
accept these diverse new elements that took the form of rights and risks, 
giving it rhetorical power and allowing it to function as a cypher upon 
which a new universality could be projected. Far from being a handicap, the 
self-evidential but ambiguous nature of the “Human” became an essential 
aspect. The drafting committee of the UDHR, after its arduous delibera-
tions, asserted, “we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us 
why” ( Hunt 2007 , p. 20). Explanations and exactitude could in fact under-
mine the “Human’s” force. As Hunt noted, “An assertion that requires 
argument is not self-evident” ( 2007 , p. 20). 
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 At the same time the twentieth century also produced new scientific theo-
ries through which human beings sought to gain some purchase on new 
instances of “human-as-category” relating to the kind of creature we were or 
were fast becoming, operating somewhere between “Man” and “Human.” 
Freudian psychoanalysis, positing a developmental theory of the uncon-
scious, circumvented if not undermined the prevailing theories explain-
ing personality (race, heredity, etc). The truth of “human-as-is” could now 
be sought in the messy libidinal undercurrents that were said to underpin 
human experience. So provocative and compelling were these theories that, 
as well as entering popular discourse, and claiming exact correspondence 
with the essence of “human-as-is,” great care was soon taken by its estab-
lished authorities to further reify these insights as an instance by standard-
izing and policing the training of analysts in the psychoanalytic method. A 
sense of professionalism was also maintained through a close association 
with the medical field ( Kerr 2004 ). Thus efforts were made not only to 
respond to the vulnerabilities that this account of the “human-as-is” pro-
vided, but also to establish and give credence to it. This movement is worth 
nothing here because, despite the antagonisms that may exist between psy-
choanalytical and existential thought ( e.g.,  Sartre 1962 ), they both have a 
preoccupation with individual, reflexive and human-human interactions 
and human-world relations. 
 More recently new technologies have generated new notions of “where” 
human beings reside or how they may be defined, populating and extend-
ing the “Human” instance of “human-as-category.” Some of these do so, 
once again, by acknowledging and emphasizing the experiences and vulner-
abilities of the “human-as-is.” According to Tobias Rees, bioscientists and 
health humanitarians are increasingly defining human beings biologically, in 
inclusive, global terms, beyond the confines of the social and the “national 
society-fostering logic” of the nation-state that defined twentieth-century 
humanitarian thinking ( Rees,  2014 , p. 470). For these actors, the nation-
state is “a failed humanity project, precisely because the humanity that the 
nation-state secures is always an exclusive one, one focused on the nation – 
on the national society – only” (p. 270). In this radical perspective, and 
contra-Arendt, statelessness “appears in a different, (almost) positive light”; 
this “positivization of the stateless” representing a “major mutation of the 
250-year-old space that has opened up the possibility of humanity” (p. 471). 
 Human and digital media 
 In the last section we have shown how, over time, “human-as-category” 
evolved both in terms of how it was defined and also in terms of its specific 
meanings. In this account we have illustrated how “human-as-is,” specifically 
the human experience and vulnerability, helped to populate specific “human-
as-category” instances. This section has also shown that, in the three examples 
we have considered, there are multiple, distinct accounts of “human-as-is” 
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with different emphases, claims about completeness of correspondence and 
engagement with notions of being and existence. These examples have illus-
trated that readings of “human-as-is” may or may not obtain and claim “cat-
egory” status such that they can perform widely in discourse: being both 
abstract enough to operate across distinctly different ideologies and publics 
and specific enough to be meaningful for these ideologies and publics. These 
same examples have also shown how understandings of “the human” have 
shifted towards emphasizing a relationship with and knowledge of the self as 
a human being, as well as relationships with other human beings. 
 Until now, we have tiptoed around the term “technology” and how exactly 
it might connect with human beings, the world and the relationship between 
human beings and the world. Consideration of technology is essential to our 
“experiment” because it has increasingly enframed and organized relation-
ships with the world, as well as with other human beings. The instances 
of “human-as-category” we have presented in the last section are certainly 
characterized by technologies in the worlds of distinct times. 
 In this section, we move towards a more explicit treatment of contempo-
rary technology, namely digital media, and its association with “human-as-
category” and “human-as-is” through considering the writings of the French 
cultural theorist Paul Virilio. We also probe how “Man” and the “Human” 
have persisted, receded and/or morphed in the late twentieth-century and 
early twenty-first century, a time of changing forms of equipment ( Drey-
fus (1992 , p. 175). In doing this, we also consider how such ‘equipment’ 
may be productive of certain vulnerabilities and even potentially transform 
mortality. 
 Virilio provides an alternative perspective to classical existential writ-
ings because of his largely overtly critical treatment of specifically modern 
technology, including digital media. His work does not assume particular 
“terrains” (Lagerkvist 2017), “groundedness” (Peters 2015), “equipment” 
( Dreyfus 1992 ), and “relations” ( Ihde 1990 ) are neural. Instead it questions 
their politics, how they came to be, how they transform the body, and what 
they are productive of in terms of life and living, including vulnerabilities. 
Although recent philosophical and existential approaches to technology 
may grapple well with its role in human beings’ experience and contribu-
tion to human beings’ existence ( Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015 , p. 26), a 
common preoccupation is with mediation, relations and their possibilities. 
Questioning the  forms of “the human” new technologies might produce is 
less common. A brief treatment of Virilio’s work provides insights into such 
forms, allowing for a critical retreat from the enframing force of technology 
that is itself characterized as a form of “cybernetic control” ( Dreyfus 1992 , 
p. 175). Like Foucault, Virilio’s work allows us to further demonstrate how 
particular formulations of “the human,” “human-as-category” in particular, 
have emerged at specific times and places, and under specific conditions. 
This work also shows how these formulations have been informed by con-
ceptions of “human-as-is.” 
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 Virilio (1997 ) presents the end of the twentieth century as an epoch 
and “terrain” of collapsed, space and time, of light speed enabled through 
technology, advances in transportation and telecommunication such as air 
travel and videoconferencing. He also articulates a precise transformation 
in human experience, specifically sensing capabilities and therefore relations 
with the world and other humans, conditioned and organized by optical 
media operating at light speed, through the concomitant “tactility at a dis-
tance” (p. 10). As a result there is a profound change in the human’s “ ani-
mal body ” (p. 11, italics author’s own) and “muscular strength” (19). This 
change started during the industrial revolution in Europe and accelerated 
after World War II with the creation of infrastructures of which digital media 
form a part, “large, force-amplifying systems that connect people and insti-
tutions across large scales of space and time” (Edwards 2003, p. 221). Space 
and the  individual body are transformed through “‘transfer machines’” 
( Virilio 1997 , p. 19) such as computer-aided design, networks and artifi-
cial intelligence, resulting in a “‘terminal man’” (11), surfacing distinct from 
urban space and the home. This “terminal man” is a simulation, persistently 
visually present given “the celebrated retinal persistence” enabled by the 
light speed of media. These media are dominated by images and enabled by 
“statistical imagery” (Virilio 1994, p. 75, cited in  Armitage 2013 , p. 67) or 
“artificial images that can only appear through fast computation, decipher-
ing and analysis of the pixels a computer graphics system can show on a 
screen” ( Armitage 2013 , pp. 67–78). These same images “create ‘rational’ 
visual allusions that damage people’s comprehension and interpretation” 
( Armitage 2013 , pp. 67–78). 
 The point of Armitage’s treatment of the image here (and we can argue the 
“terrains” through which the “exister” roams) is that its production is not 
innocent. Its production and persistence are both approximal, algorithmic 
and simulated and reliant on a digital infrastructures and protocols over 
which the individual, experiencing human has little control. Thus, as urban-
ization (and technology) sprawl, the increasingly disabled, extra-sensory, 
persistent but complexly mediated body transforms in form through new 
human-world (or flesh-silicon, cell-bit) relations. Its individual, non-
collective, diminished physicality and its relation to technology become key 
aspects and boundaries of its form and vulnerability. It is both situated in 
and beyond urban space (further informing what a “terrain” might be). Its 
technologically induced visual reach enables instant, pre-emptive mediated 
action as well as perception, rendering the importance and meaning of geog-
raphy, place and even history, irrelevant. This informs us about what the 
enframing and organizing force of digital media might actually be today: 
deeply informing any conception of “human-as-is” with regard to the nature 
of experience. 
 But Virilio (1997, p. 20) goes beyond description: he suggests something 
tragic about this “‘terminal man’s’” shift towards velocity and the remote 
real-timeness, describing a loss of individual agency, physicality and will, a 
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withdrawal into and “‘cocooning’” in media and associated transportation 
technologies. He presents 
 an individual who has lost the capacity for immediate intervention 
along with natural motricity and who abandons himself, for want of 
anything better, to the capacities of captors, sensors and other remote 
control scanners that turn him into a being controlled by the machine 
with which, they say, he talks.  
 (p. 20) 
 Thus, the mediated nature of experience becomes a vulnerability, precisely 
because of the loss of control over senses and sensing, something crucial to 
“human-as-is.” The !nal result is a “‘terminal citizen’ of a teletopical City 
that is going up faster and faster” ( Virilio 1997 , p. 21), a loss of “direct hap-
tic experience . . . and with the grounds of human being, truly expressed” 
( Cubitt 2011 , p. 72): “the world persists, but we are no longer in or of it” 
(p. 72). This is a critique of the distortion of mediation and its effect on 
human-world relations. A digitally mediated body and its senses, corrupts a 
real experience of the world. Thus, Virilio’s critique is levelled against a per-
suasive imagination “the practice of the cosmopolis: a cosmopolis in which 
the material city of touch and contact is lost in the ephemeral, disappearing 
city of images and connections mediated by images” ( Cubitt 2011 , p. 71). 
Virilio’s attacks the lack of critical engagement with information and the 
insidious production and assumption of a singular, static consumer. In the 
terms of  Conley (2006 , p. 77): “Viewers are glutted at teleports and listen to 
discourses aimed not at normalization but at the establishment of a unilat-
eral and immobile consuming subject.” 
 Virilio’s “terminal citizen” depends on the human body being situated 
in the contemporary, networked city and having its senses augmented, 
mediated and extended through both analogue and digital, and particu-
larly visual media. In this way, the “terminal citizen” materializes neither 
as knowing subject and known object, observed and observing nor as an 
abstract moral figure with retroactive rights. Instead it is a new “human-
as-category” instance that is more influenced by human-world relations, 
specifically the role of technology in going beyond mediating towards orga-
nizing and enframing. This figure has an individuated body, even if that 
body, rather than being liberated, is continually weakened and rendered less 
authentic and self-aware and more placid through digitally-enabled cell-bit, 
flesh-silicon relations. This particular, real “human” form reads as doomed, 
less because of the ambiguity and opacity that “Man” suffers, than through 
its ignorant enslavement to economic mediation and circumscribed con-
sumption brought about through visual relations. This is in contrast to the 
more abstract “Human” which, even if inherently vulnerable, is a protective 
(if retroactively protective), aspirational and self-aware figure (for how else 
would it self regulate?). “Terminal citizen” is both imbricated and brought 
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into being through digital media and thus only in a limited sense ‘internally’ 
free. Even its very presence as an instance of “human-as-is” is enframed by 
itself. The “Human,” on the other hand, offers the tantalizing, if abstract 
possibility of liberty and autonomy and is therefore pliable as a figure for 
activism. “Terminal citizen,” like “Man,” is profoundly secular in its empha-
sis on individual experience: it does not seem to require an external author-
ity (other than technology) for either meaning or existence. It is instead, like 
after-death communication, gripped by the ongoing experience of itself and 
the present (Lagerkvist, 2017, p. 104). We can observe how the “terminal 
citizen” is extended perceptually and sensorially, in ways that “Man” is not, 
and, because of these extended relations, is inescapably enmeshed in ways 
that the “Human” isn’t either: the “Human’s” very survival as an instance 
of a “category” has rested upon its mobility and concrete ambiguity. So we 
also begin to observe a very different, lurking and increasingly omnipresent 
mediating and mediated figure. This figure may itself be fallible and frag-
ile and cannot easily be accounted for solely by “human-as-is” as we have 
discussed this with relation to other instances of “human-as-category,” even 
with a generous acknowledgement of enframing technologies. It is only with 
the acknowledgement of temporal shift and worldly context of “human-as-
category” that the range and extent of the digital, infrastructural force upon 
“human-as-is” is fully noticed and realized. It shows “human-as-is” is living 
and even being defined through digital technology. Virilio shows us that, 
as well as certain exclusions being necessitated in a contemporary context 
of near ubiquitous access and use of digital media among members of the 
global middle and upper socioeconomic classes in urban contexts that, cer-
tain inclusions create new, distinct vulnerabilities. 
 “Man,” “Human,” “terminal citizen” all espouse human beings’ vulner-
abilities differently, but all have a common sense of absence and mortality. 
They do not assume omnipresent digital thrownness quite to the extent of 
Lagerkvist’s “exister.” They instead suggest cell-bit, flesh-silicon boundar-
ies and tensions. “Man’s” vulnerability relates to the very sense of it not 
having any non-contingent meaning at all and thus being threatened with 
extinction. The vulnerability of the “Human” relates to its emptiness and 
dependence on death and suffering for meaning and power. In contrast, the 
“terminal citizen” exhibits an absence of any real, worldly engagement and 
will as well as a persistence and circulation that challenges even mortality. 
It is “terminal citizen,” with its account of “human-as-is” through “human-
as-category” that makes visible and critiques the historical, political and 
economic role of digital media. It is to digital media’s affordance for creating 
human beings’ vulnerabilities, particularly those of absence and mortality 
that we turn in the next section. 
 Human now, life and death 
 What “human” inhabits relevant academic discourse on digital media and 
what kinds of vulnerabilities are articulated and elided? A simple starting 
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point is a report produced through a meeting of Human-Computer Inter-
action researchers in 2007, which echoes some of the language of exis-
tential media studies and is ambitiously entitled “Being Human” ( Harper 
et al. 2008 ). In this report “being human” is described variously as being 
transformation-oriented, as “a set of aspirations” (p. 9), and as necessarily 
influenced by current and future relationships with technology. The report 
argues for the importance of human values in the design of such technology: 
“ ‘being human’ in our relationship with technology means that we need to 
bring to the fore and better understand human values and make them central 
to how we understand and design for a changing world” (p. 35). 
 The “human” in this excerpt reaches towards “as-category” status, while 
being less centered on the “as-is,” human existence as lived through digital 
technologies. It has a profound relationship with technology, is even defined 
through these relations, and is also future-oriented. In this way it can be 
considered a hopeful advancement: none of the ambiguities and reflexive 
crises of “Man,” vagueness and contestation of the “Human” or subjugation 
and distorted mediation of artificially extended subjectivities of “terminal 
citizen” are evident. 
 In this section we will begin to come to terms with key existential themes 
for digital media that also happen to be key, recently emerging themes in the 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI): mortality ( Lagerkvist 2017 , p. 103) 
and absence/presence (p. 105). While existential approaches to digital media 
may articulate these in terms of ‘vulnerabilities,’ HCI often understands 
them as value-laden, ongoing opportunities for design as the quotation 
from Harper et al. (2008) shows. So the question we now turn to is: What 
“human” is being proposed, brought forth and practiced in recent works 
that center on digital media, design and mortality? What are the defining 
features of the “terrain” that “the exister” is navigating? We reflect on this 
question through some key works from the last five years. 
 Graham et al. (2013 ) demonstrate, through analyses of current and emerg-
ing practices of grieving and memorializing online, that even after death 
“people’s lives are extended, prolonged and ultimately changed in the pres-
ent, future and in history through new circulations, repetitions, and recon-
textualizations” (p. 133). These authors conceptualize “human” in terms of 
some related but distinct articulations of “digital selves”; that is, the digital 
self as variously an “identity,” “effigy” or “doppleganger” that enjoys mul-
tiple presences, both online and offline, and shapes how the human is “con-
sumed, worked with and viewed after death,” fundamentally altering our 
notion of bodily being (p. 134). 
 Virilio’s “terminal citizen” appears relevant here through the focus on 
visual consumption, visual persistence, the augmented body and through the 
attention given to how the figures described are given shape or inflected by 
the publics within which they are enmeshed. These authors call our attention 
to “how publics are formed and connected with through different technolo-
gies as much as which publics are created and networked” providing the 
context for understanding the live(s) and death(s) of human beings ( Graham 
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et al. 2013 , p. 135). They call forth the potentially insidious and co-existent 
status of these digital formations and show how any understanding of mor-
tality is deeply entangled with issues of absence and presence. 
 Christensen and Gotved demonstrate how online memorials alter the vis-
ibility of physical death, making death a part of our everyday lives, insofar 
as we are plugged into online social networks (2015). These authors, again 
reminiscent of “terminal citizen,” conceptualize a figure caught up in “life,” 
conceived as a dense web of significance, an individual node in a “mean-
ingful structure” that is disrupted by the person’s death, and that can be 
reconstituted by shared social/public rituals of mourning. But this figure is 
not entrapped in simulated life and commodified relationships. This ‘entrap-
ment’ is productive of sentiment and meaning: the public grieving associated 
with this figure, is “a quest to reestablish life as a meaningful structure with-
out the deceased” and to bridge the gap their death has created (Christensen 
and Gotved 2015, p. 6). In this way the reflexiveness and meaning making 
of “Man” is apparent, and digital media is a key means through which this 
is achieved. Again we observe how mortality is profoundly altered by the 
new, inferred absences and prolonged presences enabled by digital media. 
 New internet technologies also generate anew an old problem for the 
deceased, as both remembering and forgetting are threatened by the mass 
production, circulation and consumption of images of the deceased by the 
living. What emerge are not just the age-old concerns about human beings 
being forgotten and obliterated, but concerns about being remembered 
“correctly,” such that “even death is no longer a guarantee that one’s story 
is over” ( Graham and Montoya 2015 , p. 10). The “human-as-is,” in the 
present, may thus be characterized by a shift to a persistent representation 
decoupled from the body captured through “terminal citizen.” But it also is 
constituted in the increasingly fragmentary and unregulated representations 
of the deceased made possible by the internet ( Graham and Montoya 2015 , 
p. 12). These potentially prolong one’s engagement with the world beyond 
death. This is also precisely the kind of shift that Virilio describes through 
digital media with, for him, the negative consequence of detaching human 
beings from the real, as opposed to the experienced, world. Realizing the 
aspects of “terminal citizen,” that relate to how human beings are connected 
to the world, allows us to anticipate the ongoing presence and changing 
mortality of the deceased in a world permeated by digital media. This reali-
sation also shows the pathways to presence and absence the deceased afford. 
 Kern et al. (2013) provocatively assert that online memorials suspend 
the deceased indefinitely between life and oblivion through the actions of 
memory and speech permanently archived and publically displayed on social 
network sites. “If the dead are virtually memorialized, they never really die. 
The more in-depth the memorial and the greater its permanence, the more 
the deceased remain with the living” (Kern et al. 2013, p. 10). This attributes 
persistence to the dead, a consequence of the kind of visual, urban cultures 
that Virilio describes, making the real and unreal, the living and the dead 
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indistinguishable and providing the dead with an enduring, if approximated 
visual presence ( Virilio 1997 ). However, this assertion surely mistakes per-
sistence for immortality. In this way, the “as-is” element of “the human” is 
neglected and shown to be crucial in understanding (and not mistaking) 
themes of presence and absence as they relate to mortality. 
 New problems also arise from the retention of digital materials related to 
the deceased, and the need to dispose of these symbolic materials to advance 
the grieving process ( Sas et al. 2016 ;  Lagerkvist 2017 ). The deceased enjoy 
a fragmentary and complex afterlife as oftentimes, the living do not always 
wish to retain painful reminders of the dead. The disorganization of people’s 
digital collections make it “difficult to identify specific symbolic possessions 
to retain or to discard,” meaning that grieving loved ones may acciden-
tally encounter painful reminders unexpectedly, particularly online ( Sas 
et al. 2016 , p. 2). Thus the “as-is” properties of the human being and the 
visual persistence afforded by networks pose challenges for design. Those 
who try to dispose of digital materials find themselves instantly confronted 
by the “crude binary process” and “inflexibility” afforded by deletion ( Sas 
et al. 2016 , p. 2) with its own possible negative emotional and social out-
comes. This lingering, fragmented persistence is somewhat reminiscent of 
the “Human” in how these various evocative fragments can be understood 
as having rights (e.g., to be retained) that are hard to act upon ahead of the 
tragedy of death. This work is also suggestive of the dual status of “Man,” 
as both subject and object, as well as the multi-materiality and hybridity of 
the “terminal citizen” and its reliance on digital media for its circumscribed 
being and relations. Mortality may have changed, and in some sense the life 
of human beings has been extended, but the nature and subtlety of relations 
with human digital remains is defined through the mechanisms that gener-
ate, host and sort digital media. 
 Likewise, Staley has written about the etiquette of communicating around 
and with the deceased via social media platforms (2014). She notes that com-
munication is directed toward the deceased themselves and rarely toward 
the community of mourners linked by the dead individual. This indicates 
that users imagined the deceased as a certain kind of entity; one aware of the 
activities of the living, and that was able to receive electronic communica-
tions from the living through digital messages (2014, p. 13) (cf.  Lagerkvist, 
Chapter 9 this volume ). “The implication is that, though the deceased’s 
earthly body is lifeless, she retains some kind of body” that can see and hear 
these events and receive these messages (Staley 2014, pp. 14–15). Virilio’s 
“terminal citizen” is evoked because of the deceased’s visual persistence but 
so is the crisis of “Man”. How might such a figure be considered both sub-
ject and object? 
 Nansen et al. (2014) claim that the dead can enjoy “new forms of social 
persistence” and are “animated”: the dead are “no longer in repose, but 
socially active”. They also claim they are  temporal , subject to “worldly, secu-
lar and mundane engagements unmediated by church or sacrament” that are 
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temporary (2014, p. 113). This is an analysis echoed by Briggs and Thomas, 
who draw attention to the social life of one’s digital footprint after death, 
thinking through the benefits and dangers posed by our “digital ghosts” 
( 2014 ). This is in stark contrast to the kind of passive, living figures depicted 
by  Virilio (1997 ) and the primacy of the visual that they depend on. These 
later analyses also begin to invoke not only a persistent presence by the dead 
but also their potential for social action through digital media and thereby a 
place in society for them, a presence despite an absence after death. 
 These scholars and others seem to argue that ICTs may afford a partial or 
depleted form of immortality in terms of what remains present online after 
death. By contrast, analyses, like those of Kera (2014), invert this familiar 
unidirectional orientation. Death becomes simply the body losing control 
over its various elements, because the body is not, in Virilio’s (1997) terms, 
simply both depleted and sensorially extended through digital media. In fact, 
the body’s very essence is a entanglement of flesh and silicon, cells and bits. 
The entropy-drive of those elements in their anarchic diversity is revealed to 
be a neutral state, rather than in any sense a “human” unity or identity. This 
treatment veers considerably from the “human-as-is” alluded to in other 
work we have considered here, towards a new posthuman means and cat-
egory of being through digital media and particularly networks. 
 Other scholars argue that ICTs, and the rapidly evolved genealogy of 
older technologies that shaped their present form (photography, radio, tele-
phonics, etc.) have provided the avenue, within the secular regime of knowl-
edge of the late twentieth century, for the emergence of the “Human.” This 
“abstraction” that was from the beginning bifurcated between its physical/
historical specificity, and its (after)life as a collective representation, curated 
symbol, or circulated cypher ( Montoya 2015 ; see also  Fukushima 2015 ). 
It also emerged just as these older technologies were obtaining ubiquity. 
Indeed, as we may move beyond an arithmetic and probabilistic media 
ordering regime ( Cubitt 2011 ), it is perhaps the “Human” that is potentially 
the most persuasive category for its convenience, malleability and agency to 
act upon the living. While Virilio’s “terminal citizen” may connect with dis-
tinct aspects of “human-as is” and “human-as-category” presented in recent 
literature on mortality and digital media, it is the “Human” that begins to 
evoke the necessary and felt social presence and post-mortem power of the 
distributed and increasingly non-optical remains of the dead. 
 Conclusion: we (late) moderns, under the open sky 
 In this chapter we have made key distinctions in order to gain some clarity 
regarding what particular human beings are talking about when they talk 
about “the human,” creating a crude map of “the human” in recent discourse 
on digital media. To achieve this we have deployed, as a heuristic device, two 
versions of this “human” – “human-as-is” and “human-as-category” – in 
order to explore how “the human” has been conceived, proposed, responded 
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to or acted upon in the recent past. We have maintained a special focus 
on the articulation of these figures with particular configurations of dis-
course and technology. We have traced some of the various instances of 
“human-as-category” through the recent past and considered its ongoing 
relationship to “human-as-is.” It should be no surprise that we have found 
that conceptions of “human-as-category” are numerous and varied. We have 
discovered a tendency to simply conflate this “human-as-is” concept of a 
concrete, existing, mortal instance of a human being with an abstract pro-
posal concerning a universal character or “nature” or form and to not ques-
tion its possible transformation. It is possible that, as more of life is lived 
through digital media, “human-as-is” will be questioned more as “human-
as-category” reaches in, informs and even shapes it to a greater and greater 
extent. It is notable that there are elements of both in the “terminal citizen,” 
the most recent “human-as-category” we have treated, and in the way “the 
human” concept is discussed with regard to mortality, absence and presence. 
Indeed, the “exister,” like “Man,” seems to possess the ambition to emerge as 
a ‘meta’ “human-as-category” compressing the difference between “human-
as-is” to nothingness regardless of time and context. Our meagre analysis 
of contemporary academic discourse, if connecting strongly with existential 
themes, shows that while it is possible to isolate and apply discrete instances 
of “human-as-category,” there is no single, preferred instance across the 
scholarship we have considered nor even a consistent appeal to one, sin-
gular instance. “Man,” “Human” and “terminal citizen” seem capable of 
coexistence. 
 It is tempting to consider recent new anthropology in the field of artificial 
intelligence (see Richardson 2015) as pointing to new locations where we 
might encounter and/or generate particularly new instances of “human-as-
category” through explorations of “human-as-is.” The quest to develop a 
truly human-like AI necessarily must involve some sense of what the “human-
as-is” really is. Alan Turing’s famous “Imitation Game” is often credited with 
proposing “an ‘operational’ or ‘behaviorist’ definition of ‘thinking’ or ‘intel-
ligence,’ though he considered himself to have proposed merely a criterion 
rather than a definition of thinking” ( Guo 2015 , p. 4). As Turing later put 
it, his aim was to find out “ ‘how we think ourselves’ by way of ‘making a 
thinking machine’ ” (ibid), or, as we have seen with the “Human” and “ter-
minal citizen,” probing “human-as-is” through creating a new instance of 
“human-as-category”. Turing considered this self-knowledge to be a partic-
ularly human characteristic. This observation both runs through “Man,” the 
“Human” and “terminal citizen” and also necessarily expands our definition 
of “human-as-is.” It is the point of connection between our two versions of 
“the human.” 
 Yet this move to suggest another instance of “human-as-category” is 
perhaps the wrong one conceptually, underplaying how our exploration 
has allowed for another concept, on a par with “human-as-category” and 
“human-as-is,” to emerge. Guo writes that “The digitization of social and 
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personal knowledge has created an abstract web of information in a digitized 
virtual reality, in which knowledge about ourselves has been reformulated 
digitally” by means of (simple, not true) AI technologies ( Guo 2015 , p. 6). 
Thus, the self-knowledge and knowledge of other human beings that are 
crucial to “human-as-is” have been externalized and disembedded, like the 
“Human” instance of “human-as-category,” through and for an apparatus, 
in this case digital media. Guo quotes Julie Chu, who wrote that we are in 
the end all “encoding ourselves for the machine” ( Chu 2001 , p. 135, in  Guo 
2015 ) or, in the terms of  McKelvey, Tiessen and Simcoe (2013 ) a “simulation 
machine,” bringing forth extended and reshaped vulnerabilities as much as 
extended perception. These insights are in line with Lagerkvist’s conflation 
of questions of existence with questions of technology ( 2017 , p. 96) and 
argument that such technologies have become ways of being. 
 This perspective is suggestive not only of new exclusions, for human 
beings who are both absent and present, alive and dead for digital media, 
but also evokes a form of life that in its abstraction and ability to act upon 
the living is pervasive and persuasive enough to be beyond what any new 
“human-as-category” instance can describe. Digital media has enabled not 
merely extension through new forms of persistence, experience and circula-
tion but has also become a force in the world. such that we must “reengineer 
key concepts – such as attention, ownership, privacy and responsibility” to 
give us a framework within which “our onlife experience may be understood 
and improved” ( Floridi 2015 , p. 1). The ubiquity of digital media, for such 
scholars, may affect every aspect of “human-as-is,” from our self-conception 
and sociality to our very conception of reality. However, the fate of “the 
human” cannot be considered through the perspective of human beings 
alone, as we have attempted here. We have made a world from the digital 
map we sought to use to describe it. We are now not only searching for the 
means to navigate the territory the map became, but are also exploring what 
we might mean to that territory. 
 By way of example, we suggest that the “Human,” the object currently 
at the center of human rights and humanitarianism, is not only the product 
of a historical moment, a failed artefact or fabulous construct, but a new 
starting point for both critical perspectives and imaginative possibilities. 
This “human-as-category,” as our analysis shows, points us toward specific 
issues of control and rights, and tells us something about today’s histori-
cal, political, ethical and economic assumptions concerning the “human-as-
is.” It also, because of its impotence beyond a rights-focused apparatus and 
the limitations of its abstractness, forces a close examination of the precise 
nature of the time, politics and very materialities that make it possible, sus-
tain and govern it. Its absences vividly bring forth distinct, if unpredictable, 
situated and fragile presences and less visible forces, including those that 
are non-human: the infrastructural, the algorithmic, the symbolic. It may be 
the result, over the past half century, of specific conglomerations of human 
beings or “existers” seeking to think, name and speak of themselves, to carve 
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a space for themselves within, and navigate a world of rapidly evolving dan-
gers driven by technological change. 
 In an essay on the status of storytelling under commercial and industrial 
conditions of production, Walter Benjamin reflected on time, technology 
and the experience of human beings, of what remained of the human being 
caught up in the inexorable, productive and destructive capacities of the 
modern world. 
 A generation that had gone to school on a horse-drawn streetcar now 
stood under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained 
unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force 
of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile, human body. 
 ( 1968 , p. 84) 
 We must be alert not only to ‘who we are’ or ‘who we may be,’ but also to 
‘who we have been,’ as we imaginatively consider the possible fates of “the 
human” in times when digital media reach beyond the arithmetic and prob-
abilistic and embrace the imaginative possibilities of a vectoral network that 
is “not self-identical, that plunges into accident and disappointment, and in 
which machines have as much to say as humans” ( Cubitt 2011 , pp. 87–88). 
What these new struggles and categories might be, is something only time 
will tell us, but we ignore or elide the trajectory of its becoming at our peril. 
In another vein, in that same essay,  Benjamin (1968 , p. 87) also reminded 
us that the erosion of long-held notions or meanings or forms, though trou-
bling and disruptive, also makes it possible for us to recognize a new signi!-
cance, a new beauty, in what is vanishing, under newly open skies. 
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